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CASE COMMENTS
As the West Virginia Court of Claims is now established, it is
a quasi-judicial body that advises the legislature as to the validity of
claims against the state, to be approved or rejected as the legislature
sees fit. Possibly the court's decisions would gain more importance
if the Legislature would appropriate a fund, based on estimates of ex-
pected claims, from which an award approved by the court would
be paid directly without the necessity of legislative approval in each
case. This would give the court greater stature and relieve the
Legislature of the time-consuming process of approving every award.
Another solution might be for the state to follow New York 0 and
allow itself to be sued in the courts of the state as a citizen, but this
would require a constitution amendment. Nevertheless, the establish-
ment of the Court of Claims in West Virginia marks a significant
advance in West Virginia law toward the treatment of persons who
deal with or who are injured by state employees.
Danny Lee Stickler
Criminal Law-Plea Bargaining
Ray Bailey was charged with murder in 1932. The prosecution
and defense attorneys agreed that if Bailey would plead guilty to
murder with a recommendation for mercy, then the solicitor and
chief of police would recommend a pardon or parole after Bailey had
served not more than ten years. Bailey's understanding was that he
was to be released after serving no more than ten years. However
this agreement between the prosecutor and the defense was entirely
extrajudicial. Bailey pleaded guilty as agreed, but no inquiry or men-
tion was made to determine whether Bailey understood the charges
or whether his plea was voluntary. After the ten year period, the
Governor and the State Parole Board refused to grant Bailey a
pardon or parole. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that Bailey's plea was not voluntarily or understandingly made and
therefore was void. Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir.
1968).
I. The Practice of Plea Bargaining and Its Support
Plea bargaining is a commonly used technique in the administra-
tion of criminal justice. The most common forms of plea arrange-
20 N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 23 (1950). The constitution provides for a
court of six judges, with power in the Legislature to increase the number.
The court is one of record. It appoints its own clerk. It has jurisdiction to
hear and determine "claims against the state or by the state against the
claimant or between conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide."
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ments are: (1) "sentence recommendation, (2) the plea to a les-
ser included offense, (3) and the dismissal of charges in an indict-
ment, information or other charging paper."' The bargaining process
is usually initiated by the prosecutor because of his obvious advan-
tage over the accused. "In exchange for a guilty plea, the prosecutor
may agree to recommend a lighter sentence, to accept a plea to a
lesser included offense, or to dismiss other pending charges."2
The practice of sentence recommendation involves a promise by
the prosecutor that he will recommend a lighter sentence to the court
or that he will not seek the maximum punishment for the offense. In
an idealistic sense this device permits the prosecutor to consider the
individual offender in each case in an attempt to seek a sentence
which will aid the defendant's rehabilitation.' The danger involved in
sentence recommendation is that the defendant must enter a plea of
guilty in reliance upon the prosecutor's promise, which has no bind-
ing effect upon the court.
In a Delaware case4 the defendant was originally charged with
forgery which is a felony.5 Through plea negotiation he pleaded
guilty to a lesser offense of obtaining money under false pretenses,
a misdemeanor carrying no specific punishment.' The maximum
penalty for the original charge of forgery was five years. However,
the defendant was sentenced to seven years on the basis of his guilty
plea to the misdemeanor charge. The cause was remanded and the
majority of the court said "the bargain between the State and the
prisoner should not have been summarily rejected .... [T]he court is
not free to ignore the action of the State." 7
However, in an Arizona case, the state supreme court took notice
of the plea negotiation but refused to be bound by the bargain saying
that the mere existence of such an agreement does not necessarily in-
dicate that the lesser sentence would aid the defendant's rehabilita-
tion.' Considering the uncertainty incident to sentence recommenda-
tion, the practice loses all value unless there exists a reasonable ex-
pectation that the court will accept the terms of the bargain.9
' Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors To Secure
Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 866 (1964).
2 Commonwealth v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 345; 223 A.2d 699, 703
(1966).
1 Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1070 (1955).
4 Hinckle v. State, 189 A.2d 432 (Del. 1963).
5 11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 541 (1953).
6 11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 554 (1953).
7 Hinckle v. State, 189 A.2d 432, 435 (Del. 1963).
8 State v. Maberry, 93 Ariz. 306, 380 P.2d 604 (1963).
9 112 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 1, at 866.
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A less hazardous method of plea bargaining is for the prosecutor
to ask that the court accept a guilty plea to a lesser included offense.
This approach insures the court's participation in the bargaining
process, and the defendant enters his plea only after the court has
indicated its acceptance of the bargain.
The practice of dismissing other charges included in an indict-
ment in exchange for a guilty plea to one or more charges has been
unsuccessfully challenged in West Virginia. State v. Ward'" involved
a defendant who was charged in fourteen indictments of violation of
banking laws. Through negotiation with the prosecution and the
banking commissioner, both sides agreed that if the defendant would
plead guilty to one of the charges and aid the banking commissioner
in liquidation of the bank's accounts, the prosecutor would dismiss
the other thirteen indictments. The defendant performed his side
of the agreement; but, upon being released from prison he was
brought into court on an indictment which was identical to one of the
thirteen charges discharged by the court at his first trial in 1925. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, citing the case of Denhan
v. Robinson," indicated that the practice of plea bargaining has been
well established in West Virginia through a long period of usage and
has been, at least "inferentially," recognized by statute for fifty
years.' 2 Accordingly, the court held that the promise of the prosecu-
tor was a pledge of public faith, and therefore, should be honored.
A requirement essential to the validity of plea negotiations is that
the defendant must enter the guilty plea voluntarily." However, the
courts have failed to formulate a clear definition of voluntariness or to
establish any procedure to determine the voluntariness of a guilty
plea.' 4 It is established though that any form of coercion, whether
physical or mental, renders any guilty plea involuntary and subjects
the conviction to collateral attacks and the possibility of being declar-
ed constitutionally void.'"
10 112 W. Va. 552, 165 S.E. 803 (1932).
11 72 W. Va. 243, 77 S.E. 970 (1913).12 The statute referred to -is W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 2, § 25 (Michie
1966) which provides as follows:
If any prosecuting attorney shall compromise or suppress any indict-
ment or presentment without the consent of the court entered of re-
cord, he shall be deemed guilty of malfeasance in office, and may be
removed therefrom in the mode prescribed by law.
"3 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
14Nunley v. United States, 294 F.2d 579, 580 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 991 (1961).
I' Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312
U.S. 275 (1941); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927); United
States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963); Perpiglia v. Rundle, 221 F.
Supp. 1003 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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The case of Shelton v. United States'6 raised some questions con-
cerning the legality of plea bargaining. Shelton attempted to vacate
a one-year sentence by saying that his guilty plea was involuntarily
entered because of the coercive nature of the prosecution's promise
of a one-year sentence. Upon a confession of error by the Solicitor
General,"' the Supreme Court reversed the judgment without opinion.
The Shelton case led to some speculation that any guilty plea induced
by a promise of a reduced sentence from the prosecutor is void.
However, subsequent lower court cases have held that the mere exist-
ence of a prosecutor's promise does not necessarily render the guilty
plea involuntary.'" The Federal District Court of Oregon has even
said that if a "plea of guilty was coerced, [defendant] is entitled
to have it set aside, and his guilt is irrelevant."' 9
In addition to the requirement of voluntariness the defendant's
plea of guilty must be entered with an "understanding of the nature
of the charge."2 The reason for this is that a plea of guilty is of the
same effect as a conviction because "the court has nothing to do but
give judgment and sentence."'" However it is not required that the
defendant know of "all collateral legal consequences of the convic-
tion."22 In the case of Twining v. United States2 the court held
that where the defendant was aware of the severity of the offense
charged and the possible punishment involved, he had an adequate
understanding of the charges to plead guilty.24 In the instant case,
Bailey's plea of guilty was held to be involuntary because no effort
was made at the arraignment to determine if Bailey understood the
consequences of his plea.
16 242 F.2d 101, rev'd en banc on rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.
1957), rev'd per curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
17 In this case the judge admitted his failure to comply with Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18 Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
In this case the court assumed the constitutionality of a bargained plea. See
also Sorrenti v. United States, 306 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 916 (1963); Watts v. United States, 278 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Kent v. United States 272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959).
19 Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308, 313 (D. Ore. 1963).2 0 FED. R. Ca'Rm. P. 11.
21 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
22 United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3rd Cir. 1963).
23 321 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1963).
24 Some jurisdictions hold that the wording of the charging papers alone
is adequate to give the defendant an understanding of the nature of the
charge. See Mora v. United States, 317 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1963); People v.
Doyle, 20 111. 2d 163, 169 N.E.2d 250 (1960); Johnson v. State, 223 Md. 479,
164 A.2d 917 (1960); However, the mere presence of a defense attorney does
not insure that the plea is understandingly made. United States v. Davis, 212
F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954).
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II. Criticism
Critics of plea bargaining have based their arguments largely upon
philosophical considerations 5 and upon the motivation behind the
practice. 6 However, the most convincing argument is usually based
upon the realistic assumption that the practice of plea bargaining
tends to encourage an innocent man to plead guilty.2 Ordinarily
the motivation for confessing guilt is to ease one's conscience. Yet,
it is not unreasonable to assume that many innocent persons have
pleaded guilty falsely in the face of overwhelming circumstantial
evidence and aroused public sentiment which would practically in-
sure conviction. 8
Commentators have also given attention to the psychological mo-
tivations of an innocent man falsely confessing guilt.29 For example,
the psychologically defective personality known as a "pathological
liar" may satisfy his own psychological abnormal need by confessing
falsely to a crime." Another form of psychological defect supplying
the necessary motivation for false confessions is "mendacious self-
impeachment."'" Also individuals of "sub-marginal mentality" are
easily induced to falsely confess guilt to a crime. 2 Furthermore, in
many cases a simple "morbid desire for notoriety" provides ample
motivation for false confessions.3
The common criticism of plea bargaining is that it "precludes
society from imposing its full sanction upon the convicted criminal."34
Also the practice provides for little public record of the process and
therefore "is rarely subject to review by a higher court... ."" Society
has a vital interest in the sentencing of criminal offenders which
25 Commonwealth v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966).
26 Dash, Cracks In The Foundation Of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. Rav.
385 (1951).
27 See The Influence Of The Defendant's Plea On Judicial Determination
Of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).28 Id. at 221. "The judicial practice of reducing sentence following
guilty pleas works a subtle coercion upon the defendant incompatible with
the constitutional guarantee of due process."
29 Note, Voluntary False Confessions: A Neglected Area In Criminal
Administration, 28 IND. L.J. 374 (1953).3 0 Id. at 379.
31 Id. "Mendacious self-impeachment" is descriptive of an abnormal per-
sonality which receives gratification by deliberately being untruthful for pur-
poses of self-degradation and self-destruction.321 d. at 380.
3 3 Id. at 382.
34 103 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 3, at 1070.5 1d. at 1071.
1968]
5
Winter: Criminal Law--Plea Bargaining
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
should not be abrogated by arbitrary bargains between prosecutors
and defense attorneys. 6
III. Some Needed Safeguards
Plea bargaining, when accompanied with proper safeguards, is fre-
quently in the best interest of both the state and the accused."' From
the state's viewpoint, the benefits of plea bargaining are based pri-
marily on saving time, expense, and manpower. The benefits accruing
to the defendant include reduction in sentence, dismissal of other
charges, and reduction in the degree of offense originally charged.
At the beginning of any plea negotiation the defendant should be
informed of the legal significance and effect of pleading guilty." In
states which have "habitual criminal statutes" the effect of a guilty
plea in relation to this statute should be fully explained. To insure
that a defendant completely realizes the effect and consequence of a
guilty plea, the collateral results such as loss of voting privileges, the
inability to qualify for certain jobs, the stigma placed by society upon
convicts, and the fact that prior convictions may be used to determine
the length of sentence in a subsequent conviction should be outlined
in detail. The defendant should also understand the prosecutor's in-
ability to bind the court with his promises. 9
Plea bargaining should no longer be a sub rosa procedure, but every
promise from both sides should be made a part of the public record.
Since the function of the administration of criminal justice is to pro-
tect the community, then it follows that the community as such should
exercise primary control over the punishment of its offenders. Bring-
ing the process of plea bargaining from the depth of secret and some-
times false promises to an open atmosphere of honest exchange would
benefit not only the public's interests, but also the lot of criminal of-
fenders.4"
Larry Andrew Winter
36 Ohlin and Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect Upon Systems
For The Administration Of Criminal Justice, 23 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 495 (1958).
37 Commonwealth v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966).
38 See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
'
9 See State v. Maberry, 93 Ariz. 306, 380 P.2d 604 (1963); People v.
Bannon, 364 Mich. 471, 110 N.W.2d 673 (1961).
40 For an excellent list of needed safeguards in the practice of plea
bargaining see 112 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 1, at 893-95.
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